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Key Facts
• 800 UK-linked fighters are estimated to have travelled to Syria and Iraq since the 
conflicts began in those countries. 50% of these foreign fighters are thought to have 
returned.1
• Terrorism-related arrests in the UK were 35% higher in 2015 than in 2010.2
• The UK’s annual counter-terrorism policing budget has risen from £594 million in 
2015–16 to £670 million for 2016–17.3
• The Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit has secured the removal of more than 
120,000 pieces of terrorist-related content between 2010 and 2016. On average about 
100 removal requests per day contain Syria-related content, which would amount to 
36,500 requests per year.4
• The EU Internet Referral Unit (EU IRU) made over 500 referrals in the first 16 weeks 
after it was established in July 2015, of which 90% were successfully removed.5
• Between mid-2015 and February 2016, Twitter had suspended over 125,000 accounts 
globally that were linked to terrorists.6 Google removed over 14 million videos 
globally in 2014 which related to all kinds of abuse.7
• Over 90% of Bangladeshi, Indian and Pakistani Muslims living in the UK think of 
themselves as British—a higher proportion than in other ethnic groups. Over 80% 
believe it is possible to maintain both British and other cultural/religious identities 
effectively.8
• Less than 0.5% of UK journalists are Muslim, compared to almost 5% of the national 
population.9
1 Rt Hon John Hayes MP, Minister of State for Security (CEX0049)
2 David Anderson Q.C., Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, A question of trust: Report of the 
Investigatory Powers Review, June 2015, pp 42–43
3 Q823
4 Home Secretary (HSE0001)
5 Home Secretary (HSE0001)
6 Twitter (CEX0051) and “Twitter deletes 125,000 ISIS accounts and expands anti-terror teams”, The Guardian, 5 
February 2016
7 Q1007
8 Dr Saffron Karlsen, University of Bristol (CEX0057) para 2
9 “Why the British media is responsible for the rise in Islamophobia in Britain”, The Independent, 4 April 2016
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1 Introduction
1. The Government’s counter-terrorism strategy aims to reduce the threat to the UK 
from terrorism by stopping people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism, including 
through countering extremism. The range of measures used to challenge extremism in the 
UK include:
• Preventing “apologists” for terrorism and extremism from travelling to the UK.
• Giving guidance to local authorities and institutions on understanding the threat from 
extremism and the statutory powers available to them to challenge extremist speakers.
• Funding a specialist police unit which works to remove online content that breaches 
terrorist legislation, the Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit (CTIRU).
• Supporting community-based campaigns and activity to rebut terrorist and extremist 
propaganda and offer alternative views to vulnerable target audiences, working with a 
range of civil society organisations.
• Supporting people who are at risk of being drawn into terrorist activity through 
Government strategies and programmes, including Contest, Channel and Prevent.10
2. In 2015, the Government launched a new counter-extremism strategy which sets out 
four principal areas of action:
• Vigorously countering extremist ideology.
• Actively supporting mainstream voices in faith communities and in civil society, and 
all those who want to fight extremism.
• Disrupting extremists and aggressively pursuing key radicalisers.
• Building more cohesive communities, and tackling segregation and feelings of 
alienation that can help provide fertile ground for extremist messages to take root.11
In the Queen’s Speech in May 2016, the Government announced its plans to introduce the 
Counter-Extremism and Safeguarding Bill, to tackle extremism, prevent radicalisation 
and promote community integration.12
Background to the inquiry
3. The Home Affairs Committee has previously inquired into counter-terrorism and 
the UK’s capacity to respond to the terrorist threat, most recently in May 2014 and March 
2015.13 It was clear to us at the start of this Parliament that the level and impacts of 
10 Home Office, Policy paper: 2010 to 2015 government policy: counter-terrorism, 8 May 2015; and HM Government, 
Channel Duty Guidance: Protecting vulnerable people from being drawn into terrorism, April 2015, p 3
11 Home Office, Counter-Extremism Strategy, Cm 9148, October 2015, p 17. As the Government explains: “The 
strategy deals with devolved matters and we will work closely with the devolved Governments on how it should 
apply to Scotland and Wales. Where measures in the strategy deal with devolved matters and require legislative 
change this will be agreed with the devolved governments in accordance with the devolution settlements. The 
strategy will not extend to Northern Ireland at this stage.” (p 3)
12 “New Home Office legislation features in Queen’s Speech”, Home Office news story, 18 May 2016
13 Home Affairs Committee, Seventeenth Report of Session 2013–14, Counter-terrorism, HC 231 and Home Affairs 
Committee, Nineteenth Report of Session 2014–15, Counter-terrorism: foreign fighters, HC 933
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radicalisation were increasing in the UK and that there was an urgent need for strong 
narratives to counter the evil but effective messages which terrorist organisations are 
disseminating, particularly Daesh. Our concern was that families and communities were 
being deeply affected by recruitment of young men and women to fight in Iraq and Syria. 
We therefore decided to examine the Government’s strategy for tackling extremism to 
assess whether it is effective and reaches the members of society who are most vulnerable 
to radicalisation.
4. We issued a call for evidence in August 2015, seeking views on the following issues:
• The major drivers of, and risk factors for recruitment to terrorist movements.
• The effectiveness of the Prevent strategy and some of the key problems with it.
• How successfully the Government is collaborating with social media companies and 
civil society organisations to address online radicalisation.
• How an effective counter-narrative can be developed to dissuade people from being 
drawn to extremism.
5. We received over 60 submissions. We held 7 oral evidence sessions with a range 
of witnesses, including: mosques and Muslim community organisations; think-tanks, 
educational establishments and IT companies; Rt Hon Baroness Warsi; Mark Rowley 
QPM, Assistant Commissioner for Specialist Operations in the Metropolitan Police; Sir 
Charles Montgomery, Director General of Border Force; David Anderson QC, Independent 
Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation; and Rt Hon John Hayes MP, the then Minister for 
Security.
6. We held a “Big Conversation” in Bradford in January attended by about 100 young 
people, most of whom were Muslim, and who were reflective of the communities in the 
local area. This was followed in April by an international conference on counter-terrorism 
in Cambridge attended by more than 100 delegates and distinguished speakers including: 
Lord Ahmad, the then Minister for Countering Extremism; Simon Cole QPM, Chief 
Constable of Leicestershire Police and NPCC Lead for Prevent; George Selim, Director, 
Countering Violent Extremism Task Force, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; 
Ameena Blake, Assistant Secretary General, Muslim Council of Britain; Rafat Al-Akhali, 
Fellow, University of Oxford and former Yemeni Minister for Youth and Sports; and Rob 
Wainwright, Director of Europol. We were particularly grateful to Lieutenant General 
Dambazau, Minister for Internal Affairs of Nigeria, for attending as a keynote speaker.
7. We have also visited Europol in The Hague in the Netherlands and the Metropolitan 
Police’s Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit (CTIRU) in central London. The 
Chairman of the Committee and Stuart McDonald MP, a Committee Member, also visited 
Shawlands Academy in Glasgow to discuss extremism and radicalisation with pupils 
there. We would like to thank everyone who has contributed to this inquiry, particularly 
the young people of Bradford who took the time to share their views with us in such an 
interesting and frank way.
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8. In this report we have focused on extremism which affects Muslim communities 
(while recognising the differences between those communities in terms of integration, 
segregation and urban or rural status), and arising from the activities of terrorist 
organisations such as Daesh. We share the concerns about other forms of extremism, 
including political extremism. We are currently conducting a separate inquiry into 
anti-semitism. We have also issued a call for evidence on the effectiveness of current 
legislation and law enforcement policies for preventing and prosecuting hate crime 
and its associated violence; and the extent of support that is available to victims and 
their families and how it might be improved.
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2 Radicalisation
9. The report in June 2015 from David Anderson QC, the Independent Reviewer of 
Terrorism Legislation, stated that terrorism-related arrests were up by35% compared to 
2010. He noted that the number of UK citizens who had travelled to Syria and undertaken 
terrorist training since 2012 was higher than had been seen in other conflict areas of the 
21st century, such as Pakistan and Afghanistan, East Africa and Yemen. The number of 
UK-linked individuals who had been involved in or exposed to terrorist training and 
fighting was also higher than it had been at any point since the 9/11 attacks in 2001.
10. The report also concluded that the volume and accessibility of extremist propaganda 
had increased:
UK-based extremists are able to talk directly to Daesh/ISIL fighters and their 
wives in web forums and on social media. The key risk is that this propaganda 
is able to inspire individuals to undertake attacks without ever travelling to 
Syria or Iraq. Through these media outputs, Daesh has driven the increase 
in unsophisticated attack methodology seen in recent months in Australia, 
France and Canada.14
The Government estimates that over 800 UK-linked people have travelled to take part in 
the conflict in Syria and Iraq, and around half of those have returned to the UK.15
Factors contributing to radicalisation
11. Witnesses agreed that there does not appear to be any clear template for the factors 
which might lead to radicalisation. David Anderson described to us two possible 
contributory factors—grievances and ideals. The sources of grievances varied extensively 
but could include poor family relationships, bullying at school or within social groupings, 
and the UK’s foreign policy. David Anderson explained that, once this negative viewpoint 
had set in, in some people radical ideology then “battens on to the grievance and makes 
sense of the grievance and that makes sense of the person’s life”.16
12. Some other factors we have identified that may contribute to radicalisation include an 
element of brainwashing, and involvement in gang violence and low-level crime. Perceived 
grievances about UK foreign policy seem to relate particularly to matters involving Islamic 
countries. There may also be an issue for some young people around identity, and an 
inability for parents to pass on their views about the traditional practice of religion, or to 
enable their children to challenge beliefs, particularly where parents lack the necessary 
English-language skills.
13. A number of witnesses expressed doubt about the extent to which a feeling of 
alienation from mainstream UK society was a factor. Dr Saffron Karlsen of the University 
of Bristol pointed out in her written evidence that “empirical evidence does not support 
rootlessness and internal cultural conflict among the Muslim population in Britain as 
factors of radicalisation”. Her research found that over 90% of Bangladeshi, Indian and 
14 David Anderson Q.C., Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, A question of trust: Report of the 
Investigatory Powers Review, June 2015, pp 42–43
15 Rt Hon John Hayes MP, Minister of State for Security (CEX0049)
16 Q926
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Pakistani Muslims living here think of themselves as British—a higher proportion than 
in other ethnic groups. Over 80% believed that it was possible to maintain both British 
and other cultural/religious identities effectively. She concluded therefore that counter-
extremism strategies based on assumptions of a lack of integration could risk reducing 
cooperation within these communities. 17
14. Zulfiqar Karim, Senior Vice President of the Bradford Council for Mosques, agreed 
that there was not a problem with Muslim communities in the UK feeling British and 
showing allegiance to this country. He told us however that there had been a “vacuum 
in leadership” within these communities over the years.18 The community organisation 
Inspire (which states that it is independent of government) took a different view. Co-
director Kalsoom Bashir described to us a generation brought up post-9/11 who were 
“defined by the media” and “viewed through the lens of counter-terrorism”. This group had 
listened to “hardening interpretations of religion”, to stories about how the Government 
wanted to stop Muslims from practising their religion, and to views that living in the UK 
was a temporary measure. This led them to feel that they had to “choose between being 
British and being Muslim”, in addition to the normal issues that teenagers have to deal 
with. This could then make it very attractive to some young people when an individual or 
organisation tells them that they can offer something much better.19
15. Other community organisations like Maslaha agreed; its director Raheel Mohammed 
said there is a whole matrix of different factors and different influences which vary from 
case to case.20 Saleha Jaffer, director of Families Against Stress and Trauma (FAST), 
pointed to a breakdown in inter-generational communication, telling us that older people 
were increasingly unable to pass values on to the younger generation, at the same time as 
young adolescents wanting to imitate what they saw in the media and become “heroes”.21
16. Konika Dhar, sister of the radical extremist Siddhartha Dhar also known as Abu 
Rumaysah, told us she was uncertain when he started to become radicalised and that 
she was not aware of a specific trigger, rather it was a “long transition period”. She said 
that she found it hard to accept that it was her brother who was involved in committing 
the acts he was accused of because “he is my brother and as far as I am concerned I grew 
up with a different person”. When challenged about the statements she had made about 
wanting him to return home, she explained: “I don’t want to give up on him [ … ] I said 
I wanted him to come home because I am determined to have him return home as the 
person that I remember”. She acknowledged that she might have to accept that that this 
could not happen “but I feel I have not reached that point yet”.22
17. Radicalisation in prisons is also a significant issue. In September 2015, the 
Government asked Ian Acheson, a former prison governor, to conduct an independent 
review into Islamist extremism in prisons and probation. Mr Acheson’s report has not yet 
been published but he recently gave evidence to our colleagues on the Justice Committee. 
He said he had found that there was no “coherent strategy to deal with the emerging 
threat” of Islamist extremism in prisons, and that there was “far too much complacency” 
and “very poor understanding of the risk”. He identified inadequate training of prison 
17 Dr Saffron Karlsen, University of Bristol (CEX0057) para 2
18 Q723
19 Q181
20 Q1104
21 Q1106
22 Qq833, 852, 871–2
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staff, which meant they were not sufficiently confident to confront extremist ideology, and 
that the recruitment, training and supervision of prison imams was “seriously deficient”. 
He was also concerned about finding several examples of religious extremist literature in 
prison chaplaincies.23
18. There is no evidence that shows a single path or one single event which draws 
a young person to the scourge of extremism: every case is different. Identifying 
people at risk of being radicalised and then attracted to extremist behaviour is very 
challenging. It also makes the task of countering extreme views complex and difficult. 
If the Government adopts a broad-brush approach, which fails to take account of 
the complexities, and of the gaps in existing knowledge and understanding of the 
factors contributing to radicalisation, that would be counter-productive and fuel the 
attraction of the extremist narrative rather than dampening it.
19. The Government must take a much more sophisticated approach both to 
identifying the factors which instigate radicalisation and in the measures it takes to 
tackle this. We recommend the Government work with a cross-section of academic 
institutions in the UK that work on radicalisation, to marshal existing intelligence 
and research and develop a more effective understanding of the factors leading to 
extremism. This should include speaking to the families of known extremists to draw 
on their experiences. Without such a solid foundation, the strategies in the proposed 
new Counter-Extremism and Safeguarding Bill are likely to approach the issues 
and entire communities in an unfocussed manner, and therefore ultimately to be 
ineffective.
Role of technology and response of social media companies
20. Guidance issued by the National Counter Terrorism Security Office states that the 
internet has “transformed the way that terrorist organisations can influence and radicalise 
people”. It says that it has enabled groups such as Daesh to “reach a larger global audience, 
with broader and dynamic messages” which means that “vulnerable people can easily 
be exposed to extremist materials that are readily accessible online, and radicalised by 
extremist views”.24
21. Baroness Shields, the Minister for Internet Safety and Security, has described Daesh 
and other groups as operating a “dispersed network of accounts” which means that they 
are capable of reconfiguring their internet content in response to sites being suspended. 
She said that the way in which they operated on the internet, which she termed as 
“swarm casting”, allows radical sympathizers “to rapidly and automatically respond and 
reorganise their communications to ensure a near persistent presence of their messages on 
social media platforms”.25 Baroness Shields noted that the younger generation are “more 
technologically literate than their parents and teachers” and are particularly susceptible to 
online influences because they are “almost constantly connected to the digital world”. She 
stated that the extremists who influence them are from this same social media-connected 
peer group, and offer a “powerful, straightforward and simple” narrative: “join us and 
claim your place in history”.26
23 Oral Evidence taken before the Justice Committee on 13 July 2016, HC 417, Q18
24 National Counter Terrorism Security Office, Guidance: Online radicalisation, 26 November 2015
25 Home Office speech, Beyond business: the responsibility of global players, 12 January 2016
26 Home Office speech, Baroness Shields calls for united action in tackling online extremism, 23 May 2016
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22. The media has reported on the methods that Daesh online recruiters use to assist 
potential foreign fighters to join them, including helping them to plan their travel, 
connecting them with “people who will take them to a safe house”, and then arranging 
for them to be “driven to a border crossing and smuggled into Syria”, where Daesh fighters 
would be “waiting to pick them up”. In February 2015, Daesh published a 50-page “how-
to guide” for aspiring jihadis and potential recruits, circulated online in English, advising 
them how best to reach Syria, what to pack, and how to deal with Turkish border security. 
The manual advises potential recruits on gender-specific travel options, the packing of 
vital belongings, and suitable clothing. 27
23. The press has also described the way in which Daesh has moved away from the model 
used by earlier terrorist groups, of directly managing the planning of attacks carried out on 
their organisation’s behalf and the training of terrorists to commit the atrocities. Instead, 
Daesh has called on its supporters to act without seeking prior approval for attacks. Its 
broad internet reach means that anyone can simply announce their allegiance to the 
group on social media and carry out an attack in its name. A Daesh spokesperson has 
been quoted as saying “the smallest action you can do in the heart of their land is dearer 
to us than the largest action by us, and more effective and more damaging to them.”28 
The recent horrific incident in Nice, which resulted in the deaths of 84 people, including 
children, shows the danger of “lone wolves” or fixated individuals acting in the name of 
terrorist organisations (although no immediate connection to Daesh was established by 
the French authorities in relation to the perpetrator of these killings).
Tackling online extremism
24. In the UK, the public can report online content they suspect may be of a violent, 
extremist or terrorist nature direct to a specialist police unit hosted by the Metropolitan 
Police, the Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit (CTIRU). Examples of the illegal 
terrorist or extremist content placed on internet sites, chat rooms or other web-based 
forums which the Unit aims to combat include videos of violence with messages of 
‘glorification’ or praise for terrorists, and postings inciting people to commit acts of 
terrorism or violence. Specialist officers assess the information and, where appropriate, 
investigate the website or work with partners to remove it.29
25. We visited CTIRU in March 2016 to see its operation for ourselves. Between its 
inception in February 2010 and the start of 2016, the CTIRU has secured the removal of 
more than 120,000 pieces of terrorist-related content. This includes action to suspend the 
accounts of those propagating terrorist or extremist views and taking down of websites 
promoting this type of content. Removal requests average 1,000 a week, of which around 
100 items per day contain Syria-related content.30
26. The UK also supports the work of European organisations involved in countering 
online extremism. The UK seconds staff to the EU Internet Referral Unit (EU IRU) which 
was established in July 2015. In its first 16 weeks, it made over 500 referrals, of which 
90% were successfully removed.31 In January 2016, Europol, the European Union’s law 
27 “How Foreign Fighters Joining ISIS Travel To The Islamic State Group’s ‘Caliphate’”, International Business Times, 3 
March 2015
28 “Lone-wolf attack illustrates Islamic State’s far reach”, The Wall Street Journal, 14 June 2016
29 National Police Chiefs Council, ‘The Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit,’ accessed 12 July 2016
30 Home Secretary (HSE0001) 
31 Home Secretary (HSE0001)
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enforcement agency, announced the launch of the European Counter Terrorism Centre, 
an “enhanced central information hub” to increase information sharing and operational 
coordination. We visited Europol in February 2016 and saw the excellent work being done 
by the Centre to remove graphic and hatred-filled content from the internet.32
27. Previous Home Affairs Committees have long been proponents of international 
cooperation in this area. In their 2014 report on counter-terrorism, our predecessor 
Committee recommended that the Government work with Interpol and with other 
countries to create an international platform to support terrorist investigations. This 
would enable cross-checking of records, intelligence-sharing and the capacity to conduct 
transnational investigations across all Interpol member countries.33
28. The use of the internet to promote radicalisation and terrorism is one of the greatest 
threats that countries including the UK face. We commend the work being carried out 
on a daily basis by security officials and the police to counter online extremism. The 
vital function which the Metropolitan Police’s Counter Terrorism Internet Referral 
Unit (CTIRU) provides in combating online extremism has been invaluable to date 
but needs to be enhanced, extended and much better resourced to meet the scale of 
the ongoing threat. Its funding, equipment and operation should reflect the urgency 
and importance of its vital function in trying to protect the public from fanatics and 
criminals.
29. We need to win the cyber-war with terrorist and extremist organisations. We 
recommend that CTIRU is upgraded into a high-tech, state-of-the-art round-the-clock 
central Operational Hub which locates the perils early, moves quickly to block them 
and is able to instantly share the sensitive information with other security agencies. It 
is odd that when taking down dangerous and illicit material the CTIRU needs to waste 
time trying to establish contact with organisations outside the unit. Representatives 
of all the relevant agencies, including the Home Office, MI5 and major technology 
companies, should be co-located within CTIRU. This will enable greater cooperation, 
better information-sharing and more effective monitoring of and action against online 
extremist propaganda. We have also made recommendations about the role of internet 
companies in this respect. We further recommend that the security services address 
the lack of Arabic-speaking staff, and staff with Urdu, Kashmiri and Punjabi language 
skills.
30. EU organisations, such as Europol, are a vital resource for the UK in combating 
terrorism and extremism, and the UK makes a considerable contribution to European 
cooperation on these activities. We commend the leadership shown by Rob Wainwright 
as the British Director of Europol. It is imperative that the Government negotiates an 
ongoing effective relationship with these organisations, including continued access to 
and contribution to information-sharing, in the forthcoming discussions on the UK’s 
exit from the EU. The USA already has a high status in Europol, despite being outside 
the EU. The UK should aim to emulate this position on leaving the EU. Our predecessor 
Committee has previously said that platforms should be created with Interpol to deal 
more effectively with cross-border issues, particularly terrorism which is a key cross-
32 “Europol’s European Counter Terrorism Centre”, Europol press release, 25 January 2016
33 Home Affairs Committee, Seventeenth Report of Session 2013–14, Counter-terrorism, HC 231, paras 86–87
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border challenge. Freedom of movement works just as well for terrorists as it does for 
law-abiding citizens, which the measures in place to tackle it need to fully recognise. 
The UK’s exit from the EU makes our relationship with Interpol even more vital.
Industry response to online radicalisation
31. Baroness Shields has stressed that the internet industry needs to match the efforts made 
by the Government to tackle online extremism, which have included bringing experts and 
civil society groups together to develop and run more effective campaigns.34 She called 
on technology companies to take the lead in ensuring that “positive, alternative voices” 
are heard on the internet and in helping community and civil society groups to “create, 
deliver and amplify alternative content that undercuts the Daesh and other extremist 
group proposition”. She also suggested that companies invest in improving technological 
solutions that “automate the identification and removal of dangerous extremist content”, 
and effectively combat the technological devices which support the propaganda software 
used by terrorists.35
32. The then Prime Minister, Rt Hon David Cameron MP, made clear last year his view 
that technology companies need to go further in helping identify potential terrorists 
online:
Many of their commercial models are built around monitoring platforms for 
personal data, packaging it up and selling it on to third parties. And when 
it comes to doing what’s right for their business, they are happy to engineer 
technologies to track our likes and dislikes. But when it comes to doing what’s 
right in the fight against terrorism, we too often hear that it’s all too difficult.36
He was hopeful that if Parliament was clear about what was required, and worked with the 
social media companies to achieve this, a huge improvement was possible.37
33. Mark Rowley QPM, Assistant Commissioner for Specialist Operations in the 
Metropolitan Police, and the national lead for counter-terrorism police operations, believed 
that some IT firms were deliberately “undermining” counter-terrorism investigations by 
refusing to hand over potential evidence or threatening to tip off suspects. He told us that 
experience of working with companies showed that their response was fragmented and 
cooperation levels varied.38
34. We took evidence from the major social media companies—Twitter, Facebook and 
Google—to explore their views on their obligations in relation to countering extremism. 
They all told us that they took their responsibility in this area very seriously and cooperated 
with security agencies as necessary. Facebook and Google confirmed that they proactively 
notified law enforcement agencies about terrorist material which was a threat to life, 
whereas Twitter said they did not proactively do this because “Twitter is public, that 
content is available, so often it has been seen already”.39
34 Home Office speech, Beyond business: the responsibility of global players, 12 January 2016
35 Home Office speech, United action in tackling online extremism, 23 May 2016
36 Prime Minister speech, Extremism, 20 July 2015
37 HC Deb, 18 May 2016, col 31
38 “Police losing track of terror plots because of ‘irresponsible’ social media firms”, The Telegraph, 5 October 2015
39 Q1059
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35. They stressed that, while there was no easy way to identify extremist content on the 
internet, they all had teams of staff who manually search for potentially extremist content 
online and then make assessments on taking it down and suspending accounts. Twitter 
said its team who did this work consisted of “more than a hundred” staff, whereas both 
Facebook and Google declined to provide a number.40 Twitter confirmed that between 
mid-2015 and February 2016, it had suspended over 125,000 accounts globally that were 
linked to terrorists,41 while Google told us it had removed over 14 million videos globally 
in 2014 (which related to all kinds of abuse).42 Google told us about YouTube’s “trusted 
flagger” programme which allows a group of frequent and approved users to report (or 
“flag”) content about which they have concerns, which then triggers a review by YouTube 
staff.43 YouTube has worked with both government agencies and non-governmental 
organisations to create a better understanding of the guidelines and offer additional 
flagging tools. They confirmed that the accuracy rate for their trusted flaggers was around 
90%, making it easier to prioritise their flags. Facebook and Twitter said they did not have 
similar programmes though they did have arrangements with government agencies.44 We 
were also told that these companies had supported numerous community groups and 
non-government organisations with training to tackle online extremism, as part of their 
counter-radicalisation efforts.45
36. These companies, along with Microsoft, have also recently signed up to new EU 
rules on taking down illegal hate speech. The companies have agreed to meet several 
requirements including: clear processes to review illegal hate speech and clearly promote 
guidelines prohibiting promotion of violence and hateful conduct; reviewing the majority 
of valid hate speech notifications within 24 hours, and removing or disabling such content 
if necessary; improving the speed and effectiveness of communication between the EU 
state authorities and the IT companies through better awareness of correct procedures; 
providing regular training to staff on current societal developments; intensifying 
cooperation with other platforms and social media companies to share best practice; and 
continuing their work in supporting civil society counter-narratives and new initiatives. 
The rules are the first attempt to codify how major technology companies are required to 
deal with hate speech across the EU.46
37. Significant progress has been made in another online struggle—that of combating child 
sexual exploitation content—through a partnership approach between the Government, 
law enforcement and the technology industry. The Internet Watch Foundation uses its 
expertise to work with these partners to protect children and remove criminal content 
from the internet.47
38. The internet has a huge impact in contributing to individuals turning to 
extremism, hatred and murder. Social media companies are consciously failing to 
combat the use of their sites to promote terrorism and killings. Networks like Facebook, 
40 Qq 1025–1033
41 Twitter (CEX0051) and “Twitter deletes 125,000 ISIS accounts and expands anti-terror teams”, The Guardian, 5 
February 2016
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Twitter and YouTube are the vehicle of choice in spreading propaganda and they have 
become the recruiting platforms for terrorism. They must accept that the hundreds of 
millions in revenues generated from billions of people using their products needs to 
be accompanied by a greater sense of responsibility and ownership for the impact that 
extremist material on their sites is having. There must be a zero tolerance approach to 
online extremism, including enticement to join extremist groups or commit attacks 
of terror and any glorification of such activities. Manuals for terrorists and extremists 
should be removed from the internet. It is therefore alarming that these companies 
have teams of only a few hundred employees to monitor networks of billions of accounts 
and that Twitter does not even proactively report extremist content to law enforcement 
agencies. These companies are hiding behind their supranational legal status to pass 
the parcel of responsibility and refusing to act responsibly in case they damage their 
brands. If they continue to fail to tackle this issue and allow their platforms to become 
the ‘Wild West’ of the internet, then it will erode their reputation as responsible 
operators.
39. The EU rules introduced in May are a first step towards the internet companies 
assuming more responsibility. The UK Government should now enforce its own 
measures to ensure that the large technology companies operating in this country 
are required to cooperate with CTIRU promptly and fully, by investigating sites and 
accounts propagating hate speech, and then either shutting them down immediately, 
or providing an explanation to CTIRU of why this has not been done. This activity 
would be facilitated by the companies co-locating staff within the upgraded CTIRU 
and we recommend that this be part of its enhanced operations. We do not see why 
the success of the Internet Watch Foundation cannot be replicated in the area of 
countering online extremism.
40. The Government must also require the companies to be transparent about their 
actions on online extremism; instead of the piecemeal approach we currently have, 
they should all publish quarterly statistics showing how many sites and accounts 
they have taken down and for what reason. Facebook and Twitter should implement 
a trusted flagger system similar to Google’s and all social media companies must be 
more willing to give such trusted status to smaller community organisations, thereby 
empowering them in the fight against extremism. In short, what cannot appear legally 
in the print or broadcast media, namely inciting hatred and terrorism, should not be 
allowed to appear on social media. This is all the more necessary when one takes into 
account Daesh’s view that inciting individuals to take action “in the heart” of countries 
is “more effective and damaging” to those countries than action taken by Daesh itself.
Role of media
41. The Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) has highlighted the negative impact that 
misleading portrayals of Muslims in the media have had. It cited recent research which 
showed that media reporting about Muslim communities is contributing to an atmosphere 
of rising hostility toward Muslims in Britain. This includes articles that conflate Islam 
with criminality, and scaremongering and sensationalism about the threat presented by 
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Muslims which risk weakening community cohesion.48 We heard from the young people 
in Bradford about how Islamophobia was a major factor in Muslim youth feeling detached 
from mainstream society.
42. In response to our request to newspapers to explain their approach to reporting 
extremism, The Times told us it takes its responsibility seriously, by “sifting fact from 
fiction through robust news reporting and publishing a range of voices to inform and 
generate public debate”.49 Our request followed the erroneous reporting on the front page 
of The Sun on 23 November 2015 that a recent survey on the views of British Muslims 
towards young Muslims who leave the UK to join fighters in Syria found “1 in 5 Muslims’ 
sympathy for jihadists”. It was reported that the Press watchdog the Independent Press 
Standards Organisation (Ipso) received “an unprecedented 3,000 complaints” about the 
article. The Sun published the IPSO adjudication in March 2016 that it had “failed to take 
appropriate care in its presentation of the poll results, and as a result the coverage was 
significantly misleading”.50
43. Farooq Aftab, National Spokesperson for the Ahmadiyya Youth Association, told us 
he believed that the portrayal of Islam in the media was generally “sensational”.51 A study 
conducted on behalf of the Association found that one in three British adults agreed that 
Islam promotes violence in the UK, and 56% disagreed that Islam was compatible with 
British values. The Association has blamed the media for “linking any type of violence 
or crime by Muslims to Islam [which] has skewed public perception so that they believe 
Islam condones or encourages violence and extremism”.52
44. The Counter Extremism Project, a not-for-profit international organisation that 
combats the threat from extremist ideology, argued in its written evidence that the “UK 
media and its partners have a responsibility to ensure that commentary and reporting on 
world events and domestic extremism do not perpetuate the perception amongst British 
Muslims that they are unwelcome in the UK”.53 Raheel Mohammed of Maslaha told us 
that, since 2001, a generation of young Muslims has grown up being portrayed in the 
media in a particular way. He noted that the mainstream media maintained that it was 
planning to employ Muslim journalists with knowledge of Islamic affairs but the situation 
has changed very little in this respect.54 The huge under-representation of Muslims in the 
media is borne out in research which showed that less than 0.5% of UK journalists are 
Muslim, compared to almost 5% of the national population. This lack of diversity is likely 
to be further magnified at more senior positions. 55
45. The media have a responsibility to avoid contributing to negative views of 
particular groups in society through unbalanced or unsubstantiated reporting. This is 
particularly important in relation to stories about extremism and terrorism involving 
people professing to be Muslims, and in reports about views held by Muslims, because 
of the impact it can have in creating hostility towards Muslim communities and 
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alienating people from those communities, particularly young people. Islamophobia 
contributes to young Muslims feeling alienated from mainstream society, as we heard in 
Bradford and Glasgow, thereby potentially leading to them becoming more susceptible 
to radicalisation. It is not clear to us that all news editors are taking sufficient care in 
their handling of these stories and some continue to prioritise sensationalism over 
facts. They should refrain from using the term ‘so-called Islamic State’, and should 
instead refer to ‘Daesh’. We also recommend that they do not identify terrorists as 
Muslims, but as terrorists and followers of Daesh.
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3 The Government’s approach to 
countering extremism
The Prevent Strategy
46. Prevent is one of the four elements of CONTEST, the Government’s counter-terrorism 
strategy. It aims to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. It has three 
specific strategic objectives:
• To respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat faced from those 
who promote it.
• To prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and ensure that they are given 
appropriate advice and support.
• To work with sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalisation that need 
to be addressed.
The Home Office says that it works with the police, local authorities, and a wide range of 
government departments and community organisations to deliver the Prevent strategy. 
The second Prevent objective is delivered through Channel, which was first piloted in 
2007 and then rolled out across England and Wales in April 2012. The programme uses 
a multi-agency approach to protect vulnerable people by: identifying individuals at risk; 
assessing the nature and extent of that risk; and developing the most appropriate support 
plan for the individuals concerned. 56
Concerns about Prevent
47. The Prevent strategy has been subject to much criticism. The Muslim Council of 
Britain told us their perception of the strategy from community members was that it was 
not working and that there was a lot of suspicion around it. They cite one of the reasons for 
this to be a lack of engagement at the community level in which they work and network.57
48. Baroness Warsi, a former Minister for Faith and Communities, criticised the strategy 
for lacking a community cohesion aspect. She told us that she felt quite frustrated by 
the lack of proper engagement by the Government and “the number of people the 
Government refuses to speak to”; she did not understand how somebody’s views could 
be changed without speaking to them. If there were individuals or organisations which 
the Government felt it was inappropriate to include in discussions about countering 
extremism, then that list needed to be “in the public domain”, along with the reasons for 
those organisations being on the list. She believed that some of the evidence on which the 
Government was basing its decisions not to engage with certain groups was “concerning”.58
49. David Anderson, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, agreed that 
wider engagement would be beneficial; otherwise there was a risk of ending up with a 
dialogue which only involved the Government and “people who think just like them”, 
56 HM Government, Channel Duty Guidance: Protecting vulnerable people from being drawn into terrorism, pp 3–5
57 Qq4, 17
58 Qq103, 111
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and the mainstream “Muslim community talking to each other” but neither side really 
engaging with each other.59 He suggested to us that the Muslim community felt “under 
siege” and, though he did not agree there was any reason to believe Prevent was not well-
motivated, there was a risk that some parts of the Muslim community saw Prevent as “a 
sort of spying programme” when it was already feeling pressurised.60 He has therefore 
called for an independent review of the Prevent strategy.61
50. The young people we discussed these issues with in Bradford were clear that there 
was a breakdown in trust and Prevent was not working. A recent study has found that 
Muslim parents are so worried about a lack of support, and so mistrustful of the security 
services, that they are reluctant to report radicalisation. They feared “informing on their 
children might lead to other family members being arrested”.62 Haras Rafiq, Managing 
Director of think-tank Quilliam, said to us he believed it would not be easy to foster 
trust in the current environment, but that genuine dialogue with the communities—and 
engagement that was not carried out “through the lens of security and legislation”—would 
help.63 Another think-tank, Averroes, suggested to us that the Government’s Muslim 
Engagement Forum (MEF) should be open to a broader spectrum of organisations and its 
discussions more transparent.64
51. Faith Matters, a not-for-profit organisation which also runs the Tell MAMA 
Islamophobia monitoring service, expressed concern that the strategy was “too strongly” 
controlled by central Government rather than local government, which meant that the 
“input of Muslim communities” was excluded. It was also concerned about the Home 
Office defining extremism “without sufficient consultation” leading to “a risk that the 
current strategy might define key partners as potential extremists due to their political 
stances”.65
52. Some commentators believed that the lack of diversity at senior level in the security 
forces exacerbated the lack of trust in the wider Muslim community. Former Metropolitan 
Police Chief Superintendent Dal Babu said in March 2015 that the Prevent strategy was 
a “toxic brand” run by “mainly white officers with little understanding of Islam, gender 
or race”. He argued that a lack of Muslims amongst staff implementing Prevent was 
hampering efforts to stop vulnerable young people, particularly women, from travelling 
to Syria to join Daesh.66 Chief Constable Simon Cole, the national police lead for Prevent, 
said he did not recognise the concerns about these aspects of police involvement in Prevent 
but accepted that police forces working with Prevent should be transparent about what 
they do and why.67
53. The proposed Counter-Extremism and Safeguarding Bill provides an opportunity 
to address some of these issues. However, concerns have already been expressed about 
its possible impact. A multi-faith alliance of 26 organisations and individuals have raised 
concerns that the impact will be to alienate communities and undermine free speech 
59 Q934
60 Q944
61 David Anderson (CEX0041) para 13
62 “Lack of trust stops Muslim parents telling police about children travelling to Syria, research finds”, Independent, 
11 July 2016
63 Q632
64 Averroes (CEX0013) para 39
65 Faith Matters (CEX0055) para 2
66 “UK anti-radicalisation Prevent strategy a toxic brand”, The Guardian, 9 March 2015
67 Chief Constable Simon Cole QPM, Leicestershire Police (CEX0060) p 5
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rather than tackle extremism.68 This coalition includes the Jewish Council for Racial 
Equality, the Muslim Council of Britain and the former police lead for Prevent, Sir Peter 
Fahy. Critics are also concerned that, if people feel alienated, this could affect information 
gathering about possible terrorist threats as well as feed the extremist narrative about 
Muslims being picked upon.69
54. Home Office officials are also reportedly struggling to find a definition of ‘extremist’ 
to be used in the Bill that will not immediately be challenged in court. A definition in 
the Government’s strategy which focuses on ‘vocal or active opposition to fundamental 
British values’ is believed to be regarded as too broad and could be legally challenged as 
constraining freedom of speech.70 The national police lead, Chief Constable Simon Cole, 
is also concerned that the plans may not be enforceable and risk turning police officers 
into “thought police”. He said “unless you can define what extremism is very clearly then 
it’s going to be really challenging to enforce.”71 Shami Chakrabarti, the former director of 
Liberty, was concerned that there had been too much anti-terrorism legislation over the 
past 12 years, some of which, in her view, had proved to be counter-productive.72
55. The concerns about Prevent amongst the communities most affected by it must 
be addressed. Otherwise it will continue to be viewed with suspicion by many, and 
by some as “toxic”. We have heard calls for Prevent to be brought to an end (although 
notably not from Inspire or the families of those who had travelled to join Daesh). Even 
the Government’s Independent Reviewer of Terrorist Legislation has recommended a 
review of Prevent, because of it becoming such a huge source of grievance. Rather than 
being seen as the community-led approach Prevent was supposed to be, it is perceived 
to be a top-down ‘Big Brother’ security operation. Allaying these concerns and 
building trust will require full and wide engagement with all sections of the Muslim 
community, including at grassroots level—and not just with groups which already 
agree with the Government. The focus of the strategy should be around building a real 
partnership between community groups and the state. The concerns of parents about 
the lure of radicalisation, and their desire for support and advice, should be heeded. If 
stakeholders buy into such a strategy it can be successful, but unfortunately that is not 
what is currently happening.
56. The Government must be more transparent about what it is doing on the Prevent 
strategy, including by publicising its engagement activities, and providing updates 
on outcomes, through an easily accessible online portal. This will help communities 
to understand what Prevent is seeking to achieve and help to avoid it being seen as 
threatening to their culture and religion. As our predecessors have said in previous 
reports, we also recommend that the Government abandons the now toxic name 
‘Prevent’ for the strategy and renames it with the more inclusive title of ‘Engage’.
Concerns over the Prevent Duty
57. Section 26 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 places a duty on certain 
bodies (“specified authorities”) in the exercise of their functions, to have “due regard to the 
68 “Police and faith alliance attacks counter-extremism bill”, The Guardian, 21 May 2016
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need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism”. The list of specified authorities 
is set out in Schedule 6 to the Act. Guidance on the Prevent Duty was issued to these 
authorities under section 29 of the Act. The Act states that the authorities subject to the 
provisions must have regard to the Guidance when carrying out the Prevent Duty.73
58. The specified authorities include local authorities, schools, prisons, police and health 
bodies. The Duty commenced on July 2015, except for specified authorities in the further 
and higher education sectors whose duty commenced in September 2015.74
59. The Government has said it has worked with the sectors affected to ensure they are 
aware of their new responsibilities, are able to recognise the signs that someone may be 
being drawn into terrorism, and know how to access help and support.75
60. The UN’s special rapporteur on the right to freedom of assembly, Maina Kiai, 
has warned that the strategy could end up promoting extremism by stigmatising and 
alienating segments of the population and affecting the discussion of terrorism. He said 
that he had been told that some families “are afraid of discussing the negative effects of 
terrorism in their own homes, fearing their children would talk about it at school and 
have their intentions misconstrued.”76
61. Dr Sarah Marsden from Lancaster University was concerned that the duty to protect 
those at risk of radicalisation would stifle classroom debate and lead to an “overly cautious 
approach to referrals”.77 Raheel Mohammed from Maslaha, which works with schools, 
told us that teachers are concerned about not being able to create “safe spaces” within 
schools where different opinions could be voiced without fear, leading to a more restrictive 
school environment.78 Miqdaad Versi, Assistant Secretary General of the Muslim Council 
of Britain, told us that the Prevent Duty had created “discriminatory practices” for young 
students at school. He cited the example of a Muslim student asking their physics teacher 
about nuclear fission, and then being referred to the counter-terrorism team.79 Young 
people who spoke to us at our youth forum in Bradford echoed these concerns about 
comments being misinterpreted and feeling stigmatised and unfairly under scrutiny. A 
recent media survey about Prevent among teachers found opinion was divided, with some 
believing that concerns about students were better managed by teachers rather than being 
passed on to the police, and others feeling it helped them to spot signs of vulnerability in 
a child so that they could assist in preventing them going down the path of potentially 
criminal activity.80
62. The National Association of Head Teachers (NAHT) told us that, while they were 
“broadly supportive” of the Duty, they were concerned about a lack of sufficient “guidance, 
support and training for schools” to understand and implement it. NAHT reported that 
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their members were finding it difficult to access training, and possibly having to source 
training on the open market. They believed that that would raise concerns about quality 
and appropriate accreditation.81
63. We took evidence from Mark Keary, Principal, and Alison Brannick, former Deputy 
Principal, of the Bethnal Green Academy. This is the school attended by four young 
women who left the UK to travel to Syria to join Daesh, one in December 2014, followed 
by three more in February 2015. Mark Keary told us that the Prevent Duty focussed on 
the stereotype of an angry young man, but that the stereotypes needed to be updated to 
include the evolving nature of radicalisation, with young girls being groomed to travel to 
Syria.82 Alison Brannick agreed, adding that Prevent materials needed to move away from 
the stereotype that young people may be radicalised because they have been previously 
involved in criminality, and have that as a vulnerability.83 We believe that an additional 
concern is that the Prevent materials do not show sufficient understanding of the lure for 
young girls raised in conservative homes, with little freedom, who then choose to embrace 
their notion of faith and travel to a war zone.
64. Raheel Mohammed of Maslaha told us that teachers only receive about an hour’s 
training on the Prevent Duty. He believed that the training was not holistic and did not 
extend to the broader school environment. Rather than a check-list of vulnerabilities 
for teachers to keep an eye out for, he would suggest a programme about broadening 
schoolchildren’s understanding of the wider issues around terrorism and radicalisation.84
65. Sara Khan, co-director of Inspire, also told us about some feedback that the training 
was short and there was no provision for further questions and answers. She said schools 
appeared to be confused about what constituted “socially conservative practices” and what 
were “extreme ones”. However both of Inspire’s co-directors, Sara Khan and Kalsoom 
Bashir, told us their overall experience from delivering training to staff had been very 
positive. Kalsoom Bashir told us that teachers had been reassured that the Duty is part of 
their safeguarding policies; and Home Office facilitators behind the training had promised 
to continually refresh the case studies.85
66. Faith Matters is concerned about a lack of clarity about the guidance to schools around 
Prevent training. They wrote to us about uncertainty around whether local authorities 
were able to choose training providers that suited them or if the Home Office had an 
approved list of providers. They also felt there was very little oversight of the quality of 
training.86
67. Ofsted’s recent report into how further education providers are complying with 
the Prevent Duty found that not all staff had received sufficient training, and there was 
a reliance on online training which was “often too superficial to help staff understand 
the nature of specific risks”. Training was found to be more effective when education 
providers had worked with external partners. The report also found that support from 
local authorities, Prevent coordinators and the police was inconsistent.87
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68. Professor Julius Weinberg, Vice-Chancellor of Kingston University, said that the 
Government was putting universities in an impossible position by expecting them to ban 
speakers for extremism without defining extremism in sufficiently clear terms.88 Megan 
Dunn, the then President of the National Union of Students, was concerned that the 
Prevent Duty required the risk of being drawn into terrorism to be completely mitigated. 
She said that: “while we are all working towards that aim, how can that possibly be 
proven?” She also believed that there had been a breakdown in trust and told us that black 
and Muslim students feel that they are more likely to be referred to Prevent because of the 
use of profiling.89
69. The Prevent Duty has placed a responsibility on educational establishments and 
other public bodies which they are finding very hard to fulfil. We are concerned about a 
lack of sufficient and appropriate training in an area that is complex and unfamiliar to 
many education and other professionals, compounded by a lack of clarity about what is 
required of them. We recommend that the Home Office appoint an independent panel 
to reassess the Prevent training being provided to education and other professionals, to 
ensure they have the confidence to be able to deliver their Prevent Duty in the context of 
the environment in which they work, and the need to continue to deliver their primary 
function. The review team should include frontline staff and should aim to issue 
new guidance on delivering Prevent, including the provision of clear definitions of 
extremist behaviour; and to specify the length of training which professionals receive 
and when there should be follow-up training. Finally, the independent body should be 
asked to report on the advantages and disadvantages of placing the Prevent duty on a 
statutory basis and the range of institutions which are subject to the duty.
70. We have consistently heard strong criticisms about Prevent both from grass-
roots organisations and from community members. The Government must do more 
to explain its approach to any new measures aimed at countering extremism in 
advance of them being implemented. There has been a great deal of counter-terrorism 
legislation over the past 12 years, some of which has been counter-productive, as the 
former Director of Liberty told us.
71. The Government plans to introduce a new Countering Extremism and Safeguarding 
Bill shortly. It is imperative that this does not turn out to be another Bill that fails to 
achieve its objectives. Concerns have already been expressed about the approach the 
Bill is expected to take, including from the former and current national police leads 
on Prevent (Sir Peter Fahy and Chief Constable Simon Cole of Leicestershire Police) 
and a multi-faith alliance of 26 organisations and individuals. The Home Office has 
itself acknowledged that finding meaningful definitions is proving problematic. The 
Government must ensure that the Bill includes a clear definition of what extremist 
behaviour is and a full explanation of what the Government is and is not seeking to 
achieve through its provisions. This information should be made available before the 
Bill receives detailed consideration in Parliament.
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4 The security context and counter-
terrorism
Counter-terrorism funding and policing
72. The counter-extremism strategy is being implemented against the backdrop of a very 
high terrorism threat level. The then Home Secretary, Rt Hon Theresa May MP, told us in 
March that the threat level was under constant review by the independent Joint Terrorism 
Analysis Centre, but had remained unchanged at ‘severe’, which means an attack is highly 
likely.90
73. Assistant Commissioner Mark Rowley, the national lead on counter-terrorism, told 
us that terrorist threats had never been as joined up or as agile as they were now. This 
meant that the need to share detailed information at speed was greater than ever, and that 
while a lot of progress had been made there was still more to do.91 Europol plays a key 
part in the dissemination of information for countering terrorism. After the Paris attacks, 
Europol assigned up to 60 officers to support the French and Belgian investigations. The 
significant exchange of information which followed resulted in 800 intelligence leads 
and more than 1,600 leads on suspicious financial transactions. Its European Counter 
Terrorism Centre (ECTC) is an enhanced hub for the sharing of information, analysis 
of ongoing investigations and coordinating operations within the EU. By providing 
this central expertise, ECTC is expected to help combat issues such as foreign fighters, 
terrorism financing, online extremism and propaganda, and arms trafficking.92
74. Assistant Commissioner Rowley confirmed to us that the UK’s annual counter-
terrorism policing budget has risen from £594 million for 2015–16 to £670 million for 2016–
17. The main priorities for the budget included increased counter-terrorism investigative 
capacity, such as the capability to monitor online activity and digital evidence, and making 
significant deployments internationally.93
75. The then Home Secretary told us in December that, since the attacks in Paris in 
November 2015, the Home Office had looked again at police response and the provision 
of armed police in armed response vehicles, and that it was ensuring there was sufficient 
funding for an increase in these resources.94 When she updated the House on the counter-
terrorism response in January 2016, Mrs May pointed out that the counter-terrorism 
policing budget had been protected since 2010 and that there would be “an additional 
1,900 officers—an increase of 15%—at MI5, MI6 and GCHQ to better respond to the 
threat we face from international terrorism, cyber-attacks and other global risks.” She also 
said that the powers available to the police and security and intelligence agencies had been 
strengthened.95
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76. Despite the Government’s aim to provide more armed police officers, the Police 
Federation of England and Wales has warned that there is a national shortage of firearms 
officers with “worrying” inconsistencies across forces.96 The figures for 2015 show the 
number across England and Wales has fallen to 5,647, the lowest level since at least 1987.97 
In response to the fall in numbers the Home Office has agreed to fund an additional 1,000 
firearms officers for a period of five years. A further 500 armed officers are to be funded 
by local forces themselves, from within their existing budgets. Che Donald of the Police 
Federation said that, while major cities like London had sufficient firearms officers, other 
large towns and cities did not.98
77. According to Steve White, Chair of the Police Federation, funding is not the only 
issue. He told the Press Association that officers’ concerns about the level of protection 
they would receive if they discharged their firearms was also a contributory factor: 
“officers don’t want to carry firearms because they are concerned that if they discharge it, 
they are going to get arrested for murder”.99 The National Police Chiefs’ Council lead for 
armed policing, Chief Constable Simon Chesterman, agreed that potential recruits were 
being deterred by fears they could spend years under investigation after a decision to fire 
on a suspect.100
Border security
78. The Director General of Border Force, Sir Charles Montgomery, told us in December 
that the UK border is “among the strongest of all the liberal democracies of the free 
world. I would even say that totalitarian states would never declare their borders utterly 
impermeable.”101 After the terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015, Border Force 
instituted increased checking of both freight and passengers on selected routes into and 
out of the UK.102
79. Sir Charles explained to us how Border Force staff carry out specific checks to identify 
‘persons of interest’ as they leave the UK and when they return, which rely on studying 
patterns of behaviour and travel, based on profiling, and then intervene to stop people 
travelling when necessary. In the case of “hundreds” of individuals each month, checks 
lead to searches for more information about their intentions. Similar checks are carried 
out on inbound travellers in close cooperation with counter-terrorism police. On a weekly 
basis an average of over 100 people were referred from the checking process to counter-
terrorism forces, although “the vast majority” proved not to be of interest.103
80. The then Home Secretary confirmed to us that, during 2015, full exit checks were 
introduced in relation to various modes of travel out of the UK. New powers also include 
the ability to remove a passport temporarily at the border where the security services 
have concerns about an individual. This enables them to carry out further investigations, 
96 “Police federation sends warning over shortage of firearms officers”, The Independent, 15 May 2016 
97 “Do police have the firepower to tackle gun menace?”, BBC, 17 May 2016 
98 “Police chiefs struggling to recruit armed officers over conviction fears”, The Guardian, 15 May 2016
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which could lead to further disruptive action, including use of the Royal Prerogative to 
remove a passport. The prerogative had been exercised 30 times between the change in the 
law in 2013 and the end of 2014. 104
81. However, radical extremists such as Siddhartha Dhar (also known as Abu Rumaysah) 
have managed to leave the country, escaping even while being under investigation for 
encouraging terrorism. Dhar was released on bail in September 2014, banned from 
travelling and ordered to surrender his passport. Nevertheless, he is said to have travelled 
to Paris via coach from London, with his family. Several weeks later he posted a photograph 
of himself in Syria holding a rifle and his newborn baby, tweeting “What a shoddy security 
system Britain must have to allow me to breeze through Europe to IS”.105
82. The then Security Minister, John Hayes MP, acknowledged to us in November 2015 
that the UK faced a challenge at smaller airports and ports across the country, and that 
the more security was strengthened at the largest points of entry, such as Heathrow 
and Gatwick, the more would-be terrorists were being drawn to use other locations. He 
confirmed that the Government had initiated a fresh review into potential vulnerability 
at these points.106
83. Assistant Commissioner Rowley told us that his specialist team had a joint system 
with Border Force. His data centre was constantly monitoring data from sea and airports—
who had booked travel, where they were going to—and matching that information against 
indices which flagged warnings about people who were under scrutiny.107 In relation to 
people attempting to return to the UK, the then Home Secretary told us in December that 
the introduction of temporary exclusion orders had enabled a “managed return of people” 
who had been in Syria. The UK has re-joined the Schengen Information System (SIS II) 
and is working with other countries across Europe to maximise the sharing of knowledge 
so border guards can access enhanced information about individuals coming through UK 
borders.108
84. The Director General of Border Force has assured us that the UK has one of the 
strongest borders in the world and additional measures have been put in place since the 
horrific attacks in Paris in November 2015. However, we are not convinced that border 
exit checks operate at the 100% level which the Home Office has set, which would mean 
that every person leaving the country by whatever mode of transport was checked. 
Known terrorists like Siddhartha Dhar have been able to exit the country by avoiding 
the major points of departure and instead using smaller airports, ports and Eurotunnel, 
which employ weaker, purely digital processes. We call on the Government urgently to 
report to the House the conclusions of its review into security at smaller airports and 
ports. Even at the major airports it is the airlines, rather than the Government, which 
are operating as guarantors of our safety. Until 100% exit checks are fully in place, UK 
citizens under suspicion for encouraging extremism and prohibited from leaving the 
country will continue to be able to do so undetected, and could end up joining terrorist 
organisations in Syria and Iraq.
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Seizure of travel documents
85. Another important step to prevent potential terrorists travelling from the UK to join 
Daesh is to ensure that passports are removed from suspects. We were very concerned 
to learn how seemingly easy it is for those who are on police bail to leave the country. 
Assistant Commissioner Rowley told us in January that police bail was a weak provision 
and needed to be tightened. If court bail conditions were breached, the court could take 
stronger action, including holding someone in custody until the passport was surrendered. 
Mr Rowley therefore believed that breach of police bail should be made a criminal offence. 
He also told us that if someone on police bail failed to produce their passport, the police 
would simply write to them to remind them to do so, in order to create an audit trail “for 
the legal process with solicitors”.109
86. In response to questions from the Committee Chairman during a Liaison Committee 
oral evidence session in January, the then Prime Minister, Rt Hon David Cameron 
MP, made clear the Government’s intention to do more to address this issue. This was 
followed by a Government amendment to the Policing and Crime Bill which makes it a 
criminal offence for an individual released on pre-charge bail following an arrest for a 
terrorism offence to breach any conditions of that bail that prohibit them from leaving the 
country. These conditions include the requirement on an individual not to leave the UK, a 
requirement to surrender travel documents, and a requirement not to be in possession of 
any travel documents, even if they belong to someone else. 110
87. We were appalled to hear from Assistant Commissioner Rowley, the UK counter-
terrorism police lead, about the apparent ease with which Dhar and others arrested 
for terrorism offences could breach bail conditions and flee the country, despite being 
asked to hand in their passports. It seemed incredible to us that the only follow-up 
action for failure to comply was a polite reminder letter from the police. We welcome 
the Government’s acknowledgement of the importance of seizing the travel documents 
of suspected terrorists subject to police bail to prevent them travelling abroad. We 
were very pleased that the former Prime Minister’s interest in this issue, in response 
to our concerns, led to the then Home Secretary tabling an amendment to the Policing 
and Crime Bill currently before Parliament to make breach of certain pre-charge bail 
conditions relating to foreign travel a criminal offence, where the person has been 
arrested in relation to terrorism offences. The Government should ensure that the new 
legislation requires automatic notifications about individuals suspected of terrorism 
offences to be sent to HM Passport Office and the CTIRU, and that the handing in of a 
passport is made a pre-condition of bail.
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5 Countering the extremist narrative
Challenging extremism together
88. The former Prime Minister said in October that everyone has a role to play in 
confronting extremism:
I want to build a national coalition to challenge and speak out against extremists 
and the poison they peddle. I want British Muslims to know we will back them 
to stand against those who spread hate and to counter the narrative which says 
Muslims do not feel British. 111
89. The Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), which seeks to represent the Muslim 
community, confirmed to us that it routinely issued statements to condemn acts of 
terrorism carried out in the name of Islam and assisted the police with information about 
extremist material.112 In contrast, organisations such as CAGE told us that they did not 
think it was necessary for them to publicly condemn acts of terrorism. CAGE also objected 
to the use of the term ‘religious fascism’.113
90. MCB also told us that they were working within Muslim communities to try to 
understand and articulate their concerns about terrorism, and focus on how they could 
effectively tackle the radicalisation of young people in these communities.114
Support to families
91. In their 2015 report on counter-terrorism, our predecessors expressed concern about 
the support available to parents and other family members concerned about radicalisation 
of loved ones and those affected by family members travelling abroad to join terrorist 
organisations. They were also concerned about whether the “anti-terrorist helpline” was 
the most appropriate channel for encouraging people to report their concerns, particularly 
as its name alone might act as a deterrent for worried people feeling able to contact the 
authorities.115 We considered what progress had been made in addressing these issues. As 
we have set out, there are many different factors which contribute to a person becoming 
radicalised rather than just two or three triggers. Similarly, there is no single set of signs 
or “symptoms” which families concerned about radicalisation can look out for.
92. Nor is there always effective support for families affected by relatives joining terrorist 
organisations. We took evidence from Konika Dhar, the sister of Siddhartha Dhar, who 
despite having been through the emotional trauma of losing her brother, was not aware 
of any organisation that could help her nor the right process to follow.116 She was also the 
victim of unwanted media attention. A greater focus should be placed on the effect on 
111 “I want to build a national coalition to challenge and speak out against extremism”, Prime Minister’s Office press 
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families of their loved ones’ decision to join Daesh. While small community organisations 
like Families Against Stress and Trauma (FAST) who do assist families exist, they can find 
it difficult to promote their avenues of support.117
93. We were pleased to hear from Alison Brannick, former deputy principal of the Bethnal 
Green Academy, that there appears to be a clearer process in place at that school. She told 
us that concerns are first referred to the safeguarding team, who assess the situation and 
then make a referral to a social inclusion panel, where a decision is made on the next 
steps to support the student. The school also worked with the local authority’s parents’ 
advice centre, organising sessions for parents to help them better understand the risks of 
extremism, and identify signs of radicalisation, so they knew exactly what support was 
available if needed.118 Witnesses representing the East London Mosque, who denied any 
knowledge of radicalisation and were unable to clarify the ideology of their Imams, told 
us that they were approached for support by the families of the girls from the Bethnal 
Green Academy when they felt “let down by the police”, and who were “very vulnerable 
and needed a lot support”.119
94. The support made available to families of individuals who travel abroad to join 
terrorist organisations is lamentable. We were concerned to hear from Konika Dhar that 
she received no support from the Government or statutory agencies. Our predecessor 
Committee previously recommended that there needs to be an easily accessible advice 
and counselling service, particularly for parents, but also for other family members 
and friends, who wish to raise concerns and ask for help when worried about their loved 
ones being radicalised. We reiterate the recommendation for such a counselling service 
which would provide much needed support to families. We know that identifying 
the route to radicalisation and the tipping point where individuals start embracing 
extremism is complicated. By constructively engaging with the families and friends 
of people who have been radicalised, lessons can be learned, which is crucial to better 
identifying the tipping point for their transition to extremism. As a minimum, the 
Government must change the name of the ‘anti-terrorist helpline’ which can be seen as 
too stigmatising and makes people apprehensive about expressing their worries.
95. We are never going to combat terror effectively unless the communities themselves 
take on a leadership role. It is these communities that stand to lose the most when 
atrocities occur. We were deeply concerned to hear CAGE’s views on not condemning 
terrorist acts, which we believe simply increases the sense of isolation from society 
that some individuals within the community feel. We also note CAGE’s sensitivity 
about the use of the term ‘religious fascism’. We commend the speed of organisations 
like the Muslim Council of Britain in condemning atrocities, but feel they could do 
more to expose and remove those who preach or advocate race hate and intolerance, 
and particularly those who draw young people into extremism. Such large community 
organisations must also show more effective leadership in supporting families 
concerned about their loved ones. It would be hugely beneficial for the new advice 
service which we have recommended be established to be staffed by trained members 
of community organisations. The Home Office should also provide support for existing 
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community initiatives such as Families Against Stress and Trauma (FAST), including 
publicising their activities, to ensure that people are clearly aware of who they can turn 
to for support.
Rehabilitation
96. Dr Marsden of Lancaster University told us in her written evidence that even though 
people who were once radicalised might wish to move away from extremism, it can be 
very difficult to do so, particularly if they are publicly known as extremists. They have 
to deal with factors like social stigma and family tension, less access to jobs as they are 
perceived as less desirable, possible ongoing contact from extremist groups, and likely 
emotional trauma. She stated: “To rehabilitate former extremists one must recognise that 
reintegration is a two-way process: society has to permit and support the individual’s 
rehabilitation as much as the person has to want to do so.”120
97. Ian Acheson, the former prison governor who conducted an independent review of 
Islamist extremism in prisons for the Government, expressed his concerns to the Justice 
Committee recently about the readiness of the prison service to deal with returning 
fighters. He said that a senior National Offender Management Service (NOMS) director 
told him “quite blithely” that:
[ … ] the service had made no provision at all to forecast the return of jihadi 
fighters from Afghanistan or from ISIS-controlled territory or anywhere 
else because the service was big enough to absorb that. I found that quite 
astonishing, frankly. That is an example of the level of complacency that I 
observed.121
98. The French government has announced a plan to set up a dozen deradicalisation 
centres across the country. French Prime Minister Manuel Valls has said these sites would 
hold young people who might have stepped back from extremism, and their willingness 
to reintegrate into mainstream society would be tested.122 Denmark has been running a 
rehabilitation programme for returnees since 2014. They are first screened by the Danish 
police and security agencies. The programme then offers medical treatment for physical 
injuries as well as psychological trauma, and also assists with finding work or further 
education.123
99. The Government needs to have a more effective strategy to help those who have 
genuinely moved away from extremism and wish to reintegrate into society, just as 
it should also seek to support those families who have reported radicalisation by 
individuals or community groups. Indeed, ways should be found to harness their 
knowledge and experience in the fight against radicalisation if this can be done safely. 
The UK should look at the experience of other countries, including Denmark, which 
has developed a specialist approach to dealing with returning foreign fighters. There is 
no monopoly of wisdom on these life and death issues. We will look in greater detail at 
the “detoxification process” for extremists as part of our ongoing work on this subject.
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Building resilience
100. The then Security Minister, Rt Hon John Hayes MP, has said it is essential to equip 
young people with an awareness of the dangers of terrorist and extremist propaganda 
and the skills they need to protect themselves from it. He stated that: “The Home Office 
funds local projects that encourage young people to think critically about potentially 
harmful or extremist views presented on the internet through addressing all forms of 
radicalisation.”124 We believe that young people’s lack of ability or awareness of the need 
to critically challenge their beliefs is also central to the problems we have found.
101. The Counter Extremism Project suggested in its written evidence that the first step is 
to train the educators, social workers and leaders of the local community to ensure they can 
recognise and engage with young people who might be at risk of grooming.125 The think-
tank Demos also believes young people are not equipped to distinguish between truths 
and lies online and agrees it is imperative that they are taught how to protect themselves—
through training on identifying manipulation and grooming efforts and being able to 
challenge lies and misrepresentation. Education is therefore key to countering extremism 
in the longer term.126
102. The PSHE Association wrote to us about how Personal, Social, Health and Economic 
(PSHE) education provides an ideal opportunity to discuss extremism within a safe 
classroom setting. The training can be developed to help students better understand how 
extremists think to identify the “myths, misinformation and manipulative techniques” 
they use. It can also assist young people in deciding what to do if they are worried about 
friends, including “when to keep and when to break a confidence”.127
103. Engaging with and empowering young people is a critical element of the effort to 
counter extremism and provide an effective counter-narrative. From our engagement 
with young people who are most affected by these issues, it is clear that they are 
willing to discuss their concerns and share their views, and they should be given a 
safe space to do so. The Government must move urgently to develop a programme that 
helps these young people better develop the critical skills required to be conscious of 
manipulation and grooming and to actively question information they receive—both 
offline and online. It is only when they are equipped with these skills that they will be 
able to develop the resilience and tenacity necessary to deal with the complex issues of 
faith, identity and aspiration, as well as mental health, the role and power of women, 
the role of prisons, English-language skills and urban pressures. This is also why we 
have recommended a hotline that is not led by the security services. This resilience 
programme would best be developed through working with education experts, 
community organisations, social media companies and policing bodies, including 
Police and Crime Commissioners and senior police officers, which must all take steps 
to encourage young Muslims to challenge extreme interpretations of their faith.
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Developing and communicating alternate messages
104. Baroness Shields referred to a study by UK think-tank Demos which concluded that 
not enough is being done to promote “counter-speech”. (We prefer the term “counter-
narrative”.) The study suggested that governments should support civil society to develop 
counter-narrative programmes, to give them “a platform and a greater share of voice”.128
105. While many governments are active in direct counter-messaging, they are not seen 
as credible in terms of prevention or deradicalisation. The then Security Minister has said 
that the Government is working in partnership with civil society organisations to confront 
extremist narratives and provide alternatives.129 However, this does not yet appear to have 
been hugely effective in preventing young people from being radicalised and travelling 
abroad to fight.
106. The Home Office’s Research, Information and Communications Unit (RICU), 
which works on producing counter-radicalisation messages, has been criticised for 
the implementation of programmes through campaigns which do not always seem to 
acknowledge that they are supported by the Government. Critics say this could cause 
serious damage to the relationship between the Government and Muslim communities. 
For example, the vice-chair of the Institute of Race Relations has stated that people 
discovering that programmes are backed by the Government can undermine the trust 
of Muslim civil society organisations, which she blamed on the “toxicity” of the Prevent 
strategy.130
107. In contrast, the Counter Extremism Project, while setting out how civil society 
should work with Government and the private sector to find the best way to counter the 
extremist narrative, believed it was important for them to have clear information on what 
operational and financial support is available from the Government, and what training 
can be accessed.131 Quilliam agreed that counter-narrative campaigns work best when 
Government enables a partnership approach because civil society organisations can 
lack funding, whereas the private sector lacks knowledge of extremism and community 
engagement.132 Other witnesses, including Baroness Warsi and Inspire, were in agreement 
that it was better for the source of the counter-narrative to be community-led and non-
government.133
108. The Institute for Strategic Dialogue, a think-tank which has experience in organising 
partnerships of civil society networks and the private sector within the countering 
extremism field, stated that governments could be very effective in facilitating networks 
behind-the-scenes and also in removing any legal barriers that could make many 
former violent extremists reticent to speak out.134 The Institute advocates working with 
former extremists, defectors, and affected communities to find creative ways of tackling 
recruitment by extremist organisations.
109. Similarly David Anderson, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, told 
us counter-extremist messaging would be much more effective if it came from people who 
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were viewed by young people as “one of their own”. He cited the Abdullah-X YouTube 
channel, where a reformed extremist has created a series of cartoons aimed at preventing 
young British Muslims from joining jihadist groups, and stated: “The testimony of people 
who have come back from Syria and said it is not like they say, is likely to be much more 
powerful than something that the Government says”.135
110. FAST has also produced a YouTube film with testimonies from parents whose 
children have travelled to Syria, and designed an online guide for parents on the dangers 
of radicalisation.136 The short film was commissioned by the National Police Chiefs’ 
Council and focuses on three Syrian refugee mothers speaking directly to mothers in the 
UK about the realities of living in a war zone like Syria. It is complemented by letters from 
the women urging mothers here to prevent their daughters from travelling to Syria.137
111. The approaches to counter-terrorism of successive governments have not so far 
achieved the success we would all have desired (although the success of the UK’s security 
services in preventing tragedies on the scale which have been seen elsewhere should 
be noted). Instead, in some circumstances, they have created suspicion and alienation 
amongst the very people they need to reach. Most of the communities that one might 
expect to say that radicalisation was present within them gave little evidence that 
they believed it was on their doorstep. This raises suspicions that the extent to which 
Prevent has reached those it needs to is limited. This is exacerbated by the fact that 
families who identify radicalisation may tend to retreat, making them even harder to 
reach, and is a failure of so-called community groups.
112. The success of Abdullah-X’s YouTube channel in appealing to young people 
shows how, if done sensitively and in collaboration with community organisations, 
Government involvement can be effective in engaging with the target audience. The UK 
has the brightest and the best talent in the creative industries in the world, including 
in video-games. We should be using this talent to ensure that every sophisticated piece 
of extremist propaganda is countered by even more sophisticated anti-radicalism 
material. The Government must facilitate regular meetings of the leaders of the 
UK’s Muslim communities, while also recognising that many communities have no 
leadership and taking the necessary proactive steps to reach out to them. These regular 
meetings should also include think-tanks with expertise in the field and the private 
sector, to begin to build a bank of best practice counter-narrative case studies that will 
help civil society and business to implement effective counter-narrative programmes. 
Its scope should include training for community organisations and working with 
former extremists to develop and target online counter-narratives.
113. Terrorism is an overwhelming global crisis, and violent extremism is what fuels 
it. Countering it involves the portfolios of education, health, justice, home affairs, 
foreign affairs and international development. Local communities in the UK are 
ready and willing to enter the fray and defend the British way of life. The Government 
must not squander any opportunity to harness this beneficial force. It must forge 
and disseminate strong counter-narratives that will address the wilful blindness and 
blame-games of vested interests and combat the lies and deceit that the extremists 
want to feed to our young people in order to send them to their deaths.
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Conclusions and recommendations
Background to the inquiry
1. In this report we have focused on extremism which affects Muslim communities 
(while recognising the differences between those communities in terms of 
integration, segregation and urban or rural status), and arising from the activities 
of terrorist organisations such as Daesh. We share the concerns about other forms 
of extremism, including political extremism. We are currently conducting a 
separate inquiry into anti-semitism. We have also issued a call for evidence on the 
effectiveness of current legislation and law enforcement policies for preventing and 
prosecuting hate crime and its associated violence; and the extent of support that is 
available to victims and their families and how it might be improved. (Paragraph 8)
Factors contributing to radicalisation
2. There is no evidence that shows a single path or one single event which draws a young 
person to the scourge of extremism: every case is different. Identifying people at risk 
of being radicalised and then attracted to extremist behaviour is very challenging. 
It also makes the task of countering extreme views complex and difficult. If the 
Government adopts a broad-brush approach, which fails to take account of the 
complexities, and of the gaps in existing knowledge and understanding of the 
factors contributing to radicalisation, that would be counter-productive and fuel 
the attraction of the extremist narrative rather than dampening it. (Paragraph 18)
3. The Government must take a much more sophisticated approach both to identifying 
the factors which instigate radicalisation and in the measures it takes to tackle this. 
We recommend the Government work with a cross-section of academic institutions 
in the UK that work on radicalisation, to marshal existing intelligence and research 
and develop a more effective understanding of the factors leading to extremism. 
This should include speaking to the families of known extremists to draw on 
their experiences. Without such a solid foundation, the strategies in the proposed 
new Counter-Extremism and Safeguarding Bill are likely to approach the issues 
and entire communities in an unfocussed manner, and therefore ultimately to be 
ineffective. (Paragraph 19)
Role of technology
4. The use of the internet to promote radicalisation and terrorism is one of the greatest 
threats that countries including the UK face. We commend the work being carried 
out on a daily basis by security officials and the police to counter online extremism. 
The vital function which the Metropolitan Police’s Counter Terrorism Internet 
Referral Unit (CTIRU) provides in combating online extremism has been invaluable 
to date but needs to be enhanced, extended and much better resourced to meet the 
scale of the ongoing threat. Its funding, equipment and operation should reflect the 
urgency and importance of its vital function in trying to protect the public from 
fanatics and criminals. (Paragraph 28)
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5. We need to win the cyber-war with terrorist and extremist organisations. We 
recommend that CTIRU is upgraded into a high-tech, state-of-the-art round-
the-clock central Operational Hub which locates the perils early, moves quickly 
to block them and is able to instantly share the sensitive information with other 
security agencies. It is odd that when taking down dangerous and illicit material the 
CTIRU needs to waste time trying to establish contact with organisations outside 
the unit. Representatives of all the relevant agencies, including the Home Office, 
MI5 and major technology companies, should be co-located within CTIRU. This 
will enable greater cooperation, better information-sharing and more effective 
monitoring of and action against online extremist propaganda. We have also made 
recommendations about the role of internet companies in this respect. We further 
recommend that the security services address the lack of Arabic-speaking staff, and 
staff with Urdu, Kashmiri and Punjabi language skills. (Paragraph 29)
Europol
6. EU organisations, such as Europol, are a vital resource for the UK in combating 
terrorism and extremism, and the UK makes a considerable contribution to 
European cooperation on these activities. We commend the leadership shown 
by Rob Wainwright as the British Director of Europol. It is imperative that the 
Government negotiates an ongoing effective relationship with these organisations, 
including continued access to and contribution to information-sharing, in the 
forthcoming discussions on the UK’s exit from the EU. The USA already has a high 
status in Europol, despite being outside the EU. The UK should aim to emulate this 
position on leaving the EU. Our predecessor Committee has previously said that 
platforms should be created with Interpol to deal more effectively with cross-border 
issues, particularly terrorism which is a key cross-border challenge. Freedom of 
movement works just as well for terrorists as it does for law-abiding citizens, which 
the measures in place to tackle it need to fully recognise. The UK’s exit from the EU 
makes our relationship with Interpol even more vital. (Paragraph 30)
Social media industry response to online radicalisation
7. The internet has a huge impact in contributing to individuals turning to extremism, 
hatred and murder. Social media companies are consciously failing to combat the 
use of their sites to promote terrorism and killings. Networks like Facebook, Twitter 
and YouTube are the vehicle of choice in spreading propaganda and they have 
become the recruiting platforms for terrorism. They must accept that the hundreds 
of millions in revenues generated from billions of people using their products 
needs to be accompanied by a greater sense of responsibility and ownership for 
the impact that extremist material on their sites is having. There must be a zero 
tolerance approach to online extremism, including enticement to join extremist 
groups or commit attacks of terror and any glorification of such activities. Manuals 
for terrorists and extremists should be removed from the internet. It is therefore 
alarming that these companies have teams of only a few hundred employees to 
monitor networks of billions of accounts and that Twitter does not even proactively 
report extremist content to law enforcement agencies. These companies are hiding 
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behind their supranational legal status to pass the parcel of responsibility and 
refusing to act responsibly in case they damage their brands. If they continue to 
fail to tackle this issue and allow their platforms to become the ‘Wild West’ of the 
internet, then it will erode their reputation as responsible operators. (Paragraph 38)
8. The EU rules introduced in May are a first step towards the internet companies 
assuming more responsibility. The UK Government should now enforce its own 
measures to ensure that the large technology companies operating in this country 
are required to cooperate with CTIRU promptly and fully, by investigating sites and 
accounts propagating hate speech, and then either shutting them down immediately, 
or providing an explanation to CTIRU of why this has not been done. This activity 
would be facilitated by the companies co-locating staff within the upgraded CTIRU 
and we recommend that this be part of its enhanced operations. We do not see why 
the success of the Internet Watch Foundation cannot be replicated in the area of 
countering online extremism. (Paragraph 39)
9. The Government must also require the companies to be transparent about their 
actions on online extremism; instead of the piecemeal approach we currently have, 
they should all publish quarterly statistics showing how many sites and accounts 
they have taken down and for what reason. Facebook and Twitter should implement 
a trusted flagger system similar to Google’s and all social media companies must 
be more willing to give such trusted status to smaller community organisations, 
thereby empowering them in the fight against extremism. In short, what cannot 
appear legally in the print or broadcast media, namely inciting hatred and terrorism, 
should not be allowed to appear on social media. This is all the more necessary 
when one takes into account Daesh’s view that inciting individuals to take action 
“in the heart” of countries is “more effective and damaging” to those countries than 
action taken by Daesh itself. (Paragraph 40)
Role of media
10. The media have a responsibility to avoid contributing to negative views of particular 
groups in society through unbalanced or unsubstantiated reporting. This is 
particularly important in relation to stories about extremism and terrorism involving 
people professing to be Muslims, and in reports about views held by Muslims, 
because of the impact it can have in creating hostility towards Muslim communities 
and alienating people from those communities, particularly young people. 
Islamophobia contributes to young Muslims feeling alienated from mainstream 
society, as we heard in Bradford and Glasgow, thereby potentially leading to them 
becoming more susceptible to radicalisation. It is not clear to us that all news editors 
are taking sufficient care in their handling of these stories and some continue to 
prioritise sensationalism over facts. They should refrain from using the term ‘so-
called Islamic State’, and should instead refer to ‘Daesh’. We also recommend that 
they do not identify terrorists as Muslims, but as terrorists and followers of Daesh. 
(Paragraph 45)
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Concerns about the Prevent Strategy and Duty 
11. The concerns about Prevent amongst the communities most affected by it must be 
addressed. Otherwise it will continue to be viewed with suspicion by many, and by 
some as “toxic”. We have heard calls for Prevent to be brought to an end (although 
notably not from Inspire or the families of those who had travelled to join Daesh). Even 
the Government’s Independent Reviewer of Terrorist Legislation has recommended 
a review of Prevent, because of it becoming such a huge source of grievance. Rather 
than being seen as the community-led approach Prevent was supposed to be, it is 
perceived to be a top-down ‘Big Brother’ security operation. Allaying these concerns 
and building trust will require full and wide engagement with all sections of the 
Muslim community, including at grassroots level—and not just with groups which 
already agree with the Government. The focus of the strategy should be around 
building a real partnership between community groups and the state. The concerns 
of parents about the lure of radicalisation, and their desire for support and advice, 
should be heeded. If stakeholders buy into such a strategy it can be successful, but 
unfortunately that is not what is currently happening. (Paragraph 55)
12. The Government must be more transparent about what it is doing on the Prevent 
strategy, including by publicising its engagement activities, and providing updates 
on outcomes, through an easily accessible online portal. This will help communities 
to understand what Prevent is seeking to achieve and help to avoid it being seen as 
threatening to their culture and religion. As our predecessors have said in previous 
reports, we also recommend that the Government abandons the now toxic name 
‘Prevent’ for the strategy and renames it with the more inclusive title of ‘Engage’. 
(Paragraph 56)
13. The Prevent Duty has placed a responsibility on educational establishments and 
other public bodies which they are finding very hard to fulfil. We are concerned 
about a lack of sufficient and appropriate training in an area that is complex and 
unfamiliar to many education and other professionals, compounded by a lack 
of clarity about what is required of them. We recommend that the Home Office 
appoint an independent panel to reassess the Prevent training being provided to 
education and other professionals, to ensure they have the confidence to be able to 
deliver their Prevent Duty in the context of the environment in which they work, 
and the need to continue to deliver their primary function. The review team should 
include frontline staff and should aim to issue new guidance on delivering Prevent, 
including the provision of clear definitions of extremist behaviour; and to specify the 
length of training which professionals receive and when there should be follow-up 
training. Finally, the independent body should be asked to report on the advantages 
and disadvantages of placing the Prevent duty on a statutory basis and the range of 
institutions which are subject to the duty. (Paragraph 69)
14. We have consistently heard strong criticisms about Prevent both from grass-roots 
organisations and from community members. The Government must do more to 
explain its approach to any new measures aimed at countering extremism in advance 
of them being implemented. There has been a great deal of counter-terrorism 
legislation over the past 12 years, some of which has been counter-productive, as the 
former Director of Liberty told us. (Paragraph 70)
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15. The Government plans to introduce a new Countering Extremism and Safeguarding 
Bill shortly. It is imperative that this does not turn out to be another Bill that fails to 
achieve its objectives. Concerns have already been expressed about the approach the 
Bill is expected to take, including from the former and current national police leads 
on Prevent (Sir Peter Fahy and Chief Constable Simon Cole of Leicestershire Police) 
and a multi-faith alliance of 26 organisations and individuals. The Home Office has 
itself acknowledged that finding meaningful definitions is proving problematic. The 
Government must ensure that the Bill includes a clear definition of what extremist 
behaviour is and a full explanation of what the Government is and is not seeking 
to achieve through its provisions. This information should be made available before 
the Bill receives detailed consideration in Parliament. (Paragraph 71)
Border security
16. The Director General of Border Force has assured us that the UK has one of the 
strongest borders in the world and additional measures have been put in place since 
the horrific attacks in Paris in November 2015. However, we are not convinced that 
border exit checks operate at the 100% level which the Home Office has set, which 
would mean that every person leaving the country by whatever mode of transport 
was checked. Known terrorists like Siddhartha Dhar have been able to exit the 
country by avoiding the major points of departure and instead using smaller airports, 
ports and Eurotunnel, which employ weaker, purely digital processes. We call on 
the Government urgently to report to the House the conclusions of its review into 
security at smaller airports and ports. Even at the major airports it is the airlines, 
rather than the Government, which are operating as guarantors of our safety. Until 
100% exit checks are fully in place, UK citizens under suspicion for encouraging 
extremism and prohibited from leaving the country will continue to be able to do 
so undetected, and could end up joining terrorist organisations in Syria and Iraq. 
(Paragraph 84)
Seizure of travel documents
17. We were appalled to hear from Assistant Commissioner Rowley, the UK counter-
terrorism police lead, about the apparent ease with which Dhar and others arrested 
for terrorism offences could breach bail conditions and flee the country, despite 
being asked to hand in their passports. It seemed incredible to us that the only 
follow-up action for failure to comply was a polite reminder letter from the police. 
We welcome the Government’s acknowledgement of the importance of seizing 
the travel documents of suspected terrorists subject to police bail to prevent them 
travelling abroad. We were very pleased that the former Prime Minister’s interest 
in this issue, in response to our concerns, led to the then Home Secretary tabling 
an amendment to the Policing and Crime Bill currently before Parliament to make 
breach of certain pre-charge bail conditions relating to foreign travel a criminal 
offence, where the person has been arrested in relation to terrorism offences. The 
Government should ensure that the new legislation requires automatic notifications 
about individuals suspected of terrorism offences to be sent to HM Passport Office 
and the CTIRU, and that the handing in of a passport is made a pre-condition of 
bail. (Paragraph 87)
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Support to families
18. The support made available to families of individuals who travel abroad to join 
terrorist organisations is lamentable. We were concerned to hear from Konika 
Dhar that she received no support from the Government or statutory agencies. Our 
predecessor Committee previously recommended that there needs to be an easily 
accessible advice and counselling service, particularly for parents, but also for other 
family members and friends, who wish to raise concerns and ask for help when 
worried about their loved ones being radicalised. We reiterate the recommendation 
for such a counselling service which would provide much needed support to 
families. We know that identifying the route to radicalisation and the tipping point 
where individuals start embracing extremism is complicated. By constructively 
engaging with the families and friends of people who have been radicalised, lessons 
can be learned, which is crucial to better identifying the tipping point for their 
transition to extremism. As a minimum, the Government must change the name of 
the ‘anti-terrorist helpline’ which can be seen as too stigmatising and makes people 
apprehensive about expressing their worries. (Paragraph 94)
19. We are never going to combat terror effectively unless the communities themselves 
take on a leadership role. It is these communities that stand to lose the most 
when atrocities occur. We were deeply concerned to hear CAGE’s views on not 
condemning terrorist acts, which we believe simply increases the sense of isolation 
from society that some individuals within the community feel. We also note CAGE’s 
sensitivity about the use of the term ‘religious fascism’. We commend the speed of 
organisations like the Muslim Council of Britain in condemning atrocities, but feel 
they could do more to expose and remove those who preach or advocate race hate 
and intolerance, and particularly those who draw young people into extremism. 
Such large community organisations must also show more effective leadership in 
supporting families concerned about their loved ones. It would be hugely beneficial 
for the new advice service which we have recommended be established to be staffed 
by trained members of community organisations. The Home Office should also 
provide support for existing community initiatives such as Families Against Stress 
and Trauma (FAST), including publicising their activities, to ensure that people are 
clearly aware of who they can turn to for support. (Paragraph 95)
Rehabilitation
20. The Government needs to have a more effective strategy to help those who have 
genuinely moved away from extremism and wish to reintegrate into society, just as 
it should also seek to support those families who have reported radicalisation by 
individuals or community groups. Indeed, ways should be found to harness their 
knowledge and experience in the fight against radicalisation if this can be done 
safely. The UK should look at the experience of other countries, including Denmark, 
which has developed a specialist approach to dealing with returning foreign fighters. 
There is no monopoly of wisdom on these life and death issues. We will look in 
greater detail at the “detoxification process” for extremists as part of our ongoing 
work on this subject. (Paragraph 99)
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Building resilience
21. Engaging with and empowering young people is a critical element of the effort 
to counter extremism and provide an effective counter-narrative. From our 
engagement with young people who are most affected by these issues, it is clear that 
they are willing to discuss their concerns and share their views, and they should 
be given a safe space to do so. The Government must move urgently to develop a 
programme that helps these young people better develop the critical skills required 
to be conscious of manipulation and grooming and to actively question information 
they receive—both offline and online. It is only when they are equipped with these 
skills that they will be able to develop the resilience and tenacity necessary to deal 
with the complex issues of faith, identity and aspiration, as well as mental health, 
the role and power of women, the role of prisons, English-language skills and urban 
pressures. This is also why we have recommended a hotline that is not led by the 
security services. This resilience programme would best be developed through 
working with education experts, community organisations, social media companies 
and policing bodies, including Police and Crime Commissioners and senior police 
officers, which must all take steps to encourage young Muslims to challenge extreme 
interpretations of their faith. (Paragraph 103)
Developing and communicating alternate messages
22. The approaches to counter-terrorism of successive governments have not so far 
achieved the success we would all have desired (although the success of the UK’s 
security services in preventing tragedies on the scale which have been seen elsewhere 
should be noted). Instead, in some circumstances, they have created suspicion and 
alienation amongst the very people they need to reach. Most of the communities 
that one might expect to say that radicalisation was present within them gave 
little evidence that they believed it was on their doorstep. This raises suspicions 
that the extent to which Prevent has reached those it needs to is limited. This is 
exacerbated by the fact that families who identify radicalisation may tend to retreat, 
making them even harder to reach, and is a failure of so-called community groups. 
(Paragraph 111)
23. The success of Abdullah-X’s YouTube channel in appealing to young people shows 
how, if done sensitively and in collaboration with community organisations, 
Government involvement can be effective in engaging with the target audience. The 
UK has the brightest and the best talent in the creative industries in the world, 
including in video-games. We should be using this talent to ensure that every 
sophisticated piece of extremist propaganda is countered by even more sophisticated 
anti-radicalism material. The Government must facilitate regular meetings of 
the leaders of the UK’s Muslim communities, while also recognising that many 
communities have no leadership and taking the necessary proactive steps to reach 
out to them. These regular meetings should also include think-tanks with expertise 
in the field and the private sector, to begin to build a bank of best practice counter-
narrative case studies that will help civil society and business to implement effective 
counter-narrative programmes. Its scope should include training for community 
organisations and working with former extremists to develop and target online 
counter-narratives. (Paragraph 112)
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24. Terrorism is an overwhelming global crisis, and violent extremism is what fuels 
it. Countering it involves the portfolios of education, health, justice, home affairs, 
foreign affairs and international development. Local communities in the UK 
are ready and willing to enter the fray and defend the British way of life. The 
Government must not squander any opportunity to harness this beneficial force. It 
must forge and disseminate strong counter-narratives that will address the wilful 
blindness and blame-games of vested interests and combat the lies and deceit that 
the extremists want to feed to our young people in order to send them to their 
deaths. (Paragraph 113)
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